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THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
NORTH CAROLINA STATE DEBT*
JOHN V. ORTHt
Changing economic conditions, the political context, and the ideolo-
gies of the shftingpersonnel of our courts are just afew ofmanyfactors
that combine to influence legal decisions. By examining allfactors that
influence legal decision-making, and not just doctrinal theory, one is
better able to explain past legal policy and determinefactors that may
influence, or even decidefuture judicial action. In this Article, Profes-
sor Orth, a specialist in legal history, explores the history of the eleventh
amendment with emphasis on its use to repudiate or readjust much of
the debt incurred by theformer Confederate states during Reconstruc-
tion. Commentators often recognize the Supreme Court's shifting inter-
pretation of the eleventh amendment during the latter part of the
nineteenth century. They seldom attempt to explain this shift, however,
except inpurely doctrinal terms. Professor Orth, using often controver-
sial theories, attempts to set thispart of the eleventh amendment's his-
tory in the context of the economic andpolitical conditions of the time.
Influenced by apolitical climate in which this country was strivingfor
national reconciliation, the Supreme Court, according to Professor
Orth, used the eleventh amendment, which had previously been nar-
rowl confined, as a means to allow theformer Confederate states to
renege on their debts and to cover up the Court's own inability to make
a politicaly unpopular decision to order the states to pay up.
In recent years, there has been renewed interest in the eleventh amend-
ment,' the oldest amendment outside the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court
has held that the eleventh amendment bars suits by individuals against a state
to enforce rights conferred by federal legislation, in the absence of clear con-
gressional intent to authorize such suits.2 It also has held that the amendment
bars retrospective compensatory relief for past breaches of legal duty by state
officials. 3 While these decisions suggest renewed vitality in the eleventh
amendment, there is also recent evidence of a trend to limit the breadth of the
* This is an expanded and documented version of an address delivered by the author to the
Greensboro Bar Association on September 18, 1980. Portions of this Article have appeared in
Orth, The Fair Fame and Name of Louisiana- The Eleventh Amendment and the End of
Reconstruction, 2 TUL. LAW. 2 (1980). For support while preparing this Article, the author is
indebted to the Law Center Board, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A.B. 1969,
Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University.
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
2. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Wel-
fare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
3. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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amendment. The Supreme Court has held that Congress has the power to
subject states to suit for money damages in federal court, pursuant to the en-
forcement provisions of the fourteenth amendment,4 and several of the circuit
courts of appeals have held that other constitutional provisions confer similar
power.5 Furthermore, by holding that a state cannot claim immunity from
suit in the courts of another state,6 the Court has indicated that the eleventh
amendment does not make sovereign immunity constitutionally required.
The Supreme Court's reliance on the eleventh amendment in some cases
and its refusal to use the amendment in others has attracted scholarly com-
ment. Attention has focused primarily on the trend to limit the amendment.
The eleventh amendment has been designated an "endangered species,"'7 and
the devices to escape its effect have been surveyed.8 The "erosion" of state
sovereignty has been decried,9 and the long-standing refusal to extend the
eleventh amendment to political subdivisions of the states has been criticized
for placing an "unjustifiable strain" on federalism.' 0 On the other hand, some
recent scholarship has offered theories for further curtailment of the amend-
ment. It has been argued that the eleventh amendment qualifies only article
III of the Constitution and that, while the judicial branch cannot subject states
to suit in federal court, the legislative branch can constitutionally do so.II It
has even been argued that the eleventh amendment does not qualify the Con-
stitution at all, but rather modifies the common law of sovereign immunity.
12
Scholarly articles on recent decisions involving the eleventh amendment
frequently include surveys of the amendment's history. The standard version
begins in 1793 with the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.13 In
that case, over the dissent of the North Carolinian Justice James Iredell,' 4 the
Court held that federal judicial power extended to a suit against a state
brought by a citizen of another state. The eleventh amendment was proposed
4. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
5. E.g., Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979) (war powers); Mills
Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979) (copyright and patent clause); Jennings v.
Illinois Off. of Educ., 589 F.2d 935 (7th Cir.) (war powers), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
6. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, reh. denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979).
7. Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment: An Endangered Species, 55 IND. L.J. 293 (1980).
8. CommentAvoiding the EleventhAmendment: A Survey of Escape Devices, 1977 AIZ. ST.
L.J. 625. See also Comment, Implied Waiver of a State's Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 1974
DUKE LJ. 925.
9. Weick, Erosion of State Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment by Federal Deci.
sional Law, 10 AKRON L. REv. 583 (1977).
10. Comment, The Denial of Eleventh Amendment Immunity to Political Subdivisions of the
States: An Uniustifiable Strain on Federalism, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1042.
11. Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes ofActlion Against State Gov-
ernments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413
(1975); Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of
Powers Issues in Controversies about Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REv. 682 (1976).
12. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines (pts. 1-2), 126
U. PA. L. REV. 515, 1203 (1978).
13. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
14. See Fordham, Iredels Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia: Its Political Sgnificance, 8 N.C.
HIsT. Rav. 155 (1931).
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and ratified to overturn this decision.15 During the Chief Justiceship of John
Marshall, however, the amendment was narrowly confined. In 1824, in Osborn
v. Bank of the United States,' 6 the Court held that a suit is not against a state
unless the state is named as a party on the record, at least when an unconstitu-
tional state law is involved. Although the Marshallian tradition continued for
half a century, the eleventh amendment eventually was released from its con-
fines. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it was used to justify
refusing jurisdiction over a suit against a state officer when the state was the
defendant "in fact, though not in form."'17 In addition, the amendment was
held to justify refusing jurisdiction over a suit against a state brought by an-
other state to collect debts owed the latter's citizens, I8 and over a suit against a
state brought by a citizen of that state. 19 After these frolics, however, the
amendment was confined once more. As one recent student of the Court has
observed, after 1890 sophistry was "the common coin of the Court in coping
both with sovereign immunity and the bar of the Eleventh Amendment."
20
Concluding the standard historical surveys is the 1908 decision in Ex parte
Young 2' in which the Supreme Court held that federal injunctive relief is
available to bar enforcement of unconstitutional state statutes, notwithstand-
ing the eleventh amendment.
22
Although the unprecedented expansion of the eleventh amendment dur-
ing the last quarter of the nineteenth century has regularly been recognized,
few attempts have been made to account for it. The scholar who has given the
subject the most extended treatment has explained it in purely doctrinal terms:
The lack of a satisfactory rationale for the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity, and the tension between that doctrine and basic precepts of
the American Constitution, account in large part for the erratic
course traversed by the Court between 1873 and 1908 as immunity
pleas by public officers were sustained or rejected in various cases.
23
This Article will reexamine that period in light of the experience of North
Carolina, a defendant in many of the landmark cases. The Tar Heel state was
defending its right to repudiate or readjust much of its state debt. The state
was permitted to repudiate almost twenty million dollars worth of indebted-
ness, much of it owed to northern and foreign investors. Therefore, attention
will be paid to questions of state finance. In order to understand this period,
however, the analysis must extend beyond economic considerations. The
political climate in which the Supreme Court reached its decisions will also be
15. See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
16. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
17. In re Ayres, 123 U.S. 443, 489 (1887). See also Louisiana ex rel. Elliott v. Jumel, 107
U.S. 711 (1883).
18. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
19. North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
20. J. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT REsPONDS TO A CHANG-
ING SoCIETY, 1890-1920, at 191 (1978).
21. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
22. Id. at 156-60.
23. C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 155 (1972).
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examined. The decisions expanding the eleventh amendment will, in other
words, be placed in their economic and political context, rather than be taken
simply as doctrinal statements. Before that can be done, however, the course
of the amendment from its ratification in 1798 through the aftermath of the
Civil War must be reviewed in some detail.
I. RATIFICATION AND EARLY INTERPRETATION
Historical surveys of the eleventh amendment invariably include refer-
ences to the economic and political milieu of the early Republic. 24 To finance
the Revolutionary War the states had contracted large debts; to exhibit patri-
otic fervor they had confiscated the property of American Loyalists. Because
of the states' potential liabilities, some attention was paid to their suability in
the national courts authorized by the proposed federal Constitution. The issue
occasionally was raised-during the debates on ratification, although it appar-
ently was overshadowed by the larger problems of nation building. Despite
the diligence of scholars, no consensus has emerged on the original under-
standing of sovereign immunity under the Constitution of 1787. Perhaps the
most that can be said is that James Wilson told the Pennsylvania ratification
convention that the states could be sued,25 and John Marshall told the Vir-
ginia ratification convention that they could not.26
Whatever the original understanding, the Supreme Court soon took juris-
diction over a suit by a citizen of one state against another state.27 Alexander
Chisholm, the executor of the estate of a South Carolina citizen, filed an origi-
nal action in the Supreme Court to compel Georgia to pay a debt owed his
decedent. Georgia refused to appear, and the Court in due course issued a
judgment against it. According to Supreme Court Justice Joseph P. Bradley,
writing a century later, the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia sent a "shock of
surprise" through the Nation.28 Fear that claimants, particularly British and
Loyalist claimants, would resort to the Supreme Court for enforcement of
their claims moved the states speedily to amend the Constitution. The elev-
enth amendment denied the federal courts jurisdiction over suits like
Chisholm.
Just as scholarly attention focuses on the political and economic milieu of
Chisholm, so it regularly focuses on the Federalist ideology of John Marshall,
Chief Justice of the United States from 1801 to 1835.29 The Federalist Party
24. See, e.g., id. at 3-74; Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L.
REV. 139, 140-47 (1977); Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (4 Case of the White
Knightr Green Whiskers), 5 Hous. L. REV. 1, 6-14 (1967); Engdahl, Immunity andAccountability
for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1972); Field, supra note 12, at 527-
36; Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REV. 207, 211-30
(1968); Nowak, supra note 11, at 1422-41; Comment, supra note 10, at 1057-62.
25. 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 491 (2d ed. 1888).
26. 3 id. at 555.
27. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalL) 419 (1793).
28. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
29. See 4 A. BEVERIDOE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 117, 169, 308 (1919); 3 A. BEVER-
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favored a strong central government, encouragement of industry, protection of
property, and a well-ordered society. 30 In 1801 the Federalists lost control-
permanently, as it turned out-of the legislative and executive branches. The
judicial branch, staffed by Federalist appointees of Washington and Adams,
remained the last bastion of Federalism. By limiting the jurisdiction of the
national courts, the eleventh amendment endangered the central tenets of the
Federalist faith. On the bench, John Marshall forgot his reassurances to the
Virginia ratifying convention; instead, the Federalist Chief Justice led the
Supreme Court to defend its jurisdiction in a series of landmark decisions. In
nine cases3' the Marshall Court faced challenges to its jurisdiction based on
the eleventh amendment, but in none of the important constitutional cases of
the day did the Court find itself deprived ofjurisdiction by the amendment. In
United States v. Peters,32 the Court held that a state could not assert the elev-
enth amendment on behalf of an individual defendant merely because the
state claimed an interest in the subject matter of the dispute.33 In Cohens v.
Virginia,34 it faced an argument, based on the eleventh amendment, that it
lacked jurisdiction to review state criminal convictions, because the writ of
error by which such convictions were reviewed was itself a "suit in law...
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States." As the plaintiffs
in this particular writ of error were citizens of Virginia, the amendment did
not apply according to its terms. The argument was that, because the amend-
ment denied to foreigners and citizens of other states the right to prosecute
suits against a state, it implied that the federal courts never had jurisdiction
over suits between a state and its citizens; otherwise the anomaly would result
that a state could be sued in federal court by its own citizens, but not by for-
eigners or citizens of another state. In an opinion by the Chief Justice, the
Court rejected that argument on the ground that process by writ of error was
not a suit within the meaning of the amendment. But the Chief Justice also
made clear that even if it were, Virginia would not be able to rely on the
amendment because the suit was not "commenced or prosecuted. . . by Citi-
zens of another State."
35
Finally, in 1824, John Marshall led the Court to confine the amendment
MOE, at 594; E. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 98 (1938); F. FRANKFURTER, THE COM-
MERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE 14 (1937); C. HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789-1835, at 619 (1960); B.
WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 43 (1942). But see Nelson, The
Eighteenth-Century Background of .John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV.
893 (1978).
30. J. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA, 1789-1801, at 116-17 (1960).
31. Exparte Madrazzo, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 627 (1833); New Jersey v. New York, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
284 (1831); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Governor of Georgia v.
Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828); Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824);
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820);
United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).
32. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).
33. Id. at 139-41.
34. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
35. Id. at 389-96.
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more narrowly than ever before. In Osborn v. Bank of the United States,36 the
Court held that a suit was not "against one of the United States" unless the
state was a defendant of record.37 By implication, a plaintiff could avoid the
bar of the amendment simply by suing an officer of the state, rather than the
state itself. Furthermore, the Court held that a state officer acting pursuant to
an unconstitutional state law was acting not as an agent of the state, but in his
individual capacity.38 Thus, whenever a state officer was enforcing a law that
was unconstitutional, or even alleged to be unconstitutional, the state's immu-
nity from suit did not protect him. Also in 1824, in another suit involving the
Bank of the United States, the Marshall Court curtailed the eleventh amend-
ment by narrowly defining the words "one of the United States": a corpora-
tion chartered by a state and partly owned by it could not avail itself of the
state's immunity.39 The same result was reached even when the state owned
all the stock in the corporation.
40
In one case only, Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo,41 did the Marshall
Court find itself without jurisdiction because of the eleventh amendment. Al-
though in Osborn the Chief Justice had laid it down "as a rule which admits of
no exception, that, in all cases where jurisdiction depends on the party, it is the
party named in the record,"'42 he in fact admitted an exception only four years
later:
[Where the chief magistrate of a state is sued, not by his name, but
by his style of office, and the claim made upon him is entirely in his
official character, we think the state itself may be considered as a
party on the record. If the state is not a party, there is no party
against whom a decree can be made.
43
Madrazo was clearly not the rule, but the exception, aild a minor one at
that: it was not even mentioned in the standard collebtions of Marshall's
"complete constitutional decisions." 44 So effectively did the great Chief Jus-
tice confine the eleventh amendment that it never once prevailed during the
long chief justiceship of his successor, Roger B. Taney, despite the Taney
Court's well-known sympathy for states' rights. The amendment was cited in
five cases45 and rejected in all of them. Madrazo was cited by a majority only
once, and then not relied upon;46 otherwise it was referred to only twice, in
36. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
37. Id. at 842-43.
38. Id. at 843-44.
39. Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 906-07
(1824).
40. Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 318 (1829).
41. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828). See also Exparle Madrazzo, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 627 (1833).
42. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 857.
43. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 123-24.
44. CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS OF JOHN MARSHALL (J. Cotton ed. 1905); JOHN MARSHALL:
COMPLETE CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS (J. Dillon ed. 1903).
45. Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 381 (1851); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1
(1849); McNutt v. Bland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 9 (1844); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 657 (1838); Livingston v. Story, 36 U.S. (I1 Pet.) 351 (1837).
46. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 97 (1860).
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dissents.47
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DURING RECONSTRUCTION
At the outbreak of the Civil War, the law of the eleventh amendment was
well settled, and there seemed little reason to expect that the outcome of the
war would deflect American constitutionalism in the direction of states' rights.
After all, the United States Army won the war to preserve the Union. For a
dozen years after the war, the national government pursued a policy of Recon-
struction.48 The defeated states of the Confederacy needed to be supplied with
loyal governments and restored to the Union, and the place of the emanci-
pated Negroes in Southern society had to be defined. These ambitious aims
demanded the concentration of power in the national government. Until 1877
federal troops occupied parts of the South. The judicial analogue of military
occupation was the extension of federal jurisdiction. Piecemeal additions dur-
ing the war and after culminated in the Judiciary Act of 1875, which gave the
lower federal courts jurisdiction over all federal questions. 49 Neither the law
nor the politics of Reconstruction dictated a departure from the Marshallian
tradition on the eleventh amendment. The standard laid down in Osborn fifty
years earlier remained the law of the land.
Some of the shadiest financing of the era of Reconstruction involved the
bonded indebtedness of the states of the old Confederacy. The Southern gov-
ernments-the Carpetbagger regimes of popular history-floated extravagant
bond issues, ostensibly for internal improvements. The North Carolina state
debt, for example, more than doubled in the five years after the end of the
Civil War.50 Particularly reckless and dishonest financiering marked the Re-
publican administration of Governor William W. Holden from 1868 to 1870.sl
Millions of dollars of state bonds, bearing six percent interest, were issued to
railroads, whose stock was pledged to the state as security. As North Caro-
lina's Reconstruction Constitution of 1868 prohibited the issue of any bonds
without the simultaneous levy of a special tax to pay the annual interest,5 2 the
legislature enacted several special taxes; but it confidently expected not to need
the revenue, because the dividends on the railroad stock would pay the interest
on the bonds. The state was, of course, destitute at this time. In addition to
the military losses, the thirteenth amendment5 3 in 1865 had destroyed the cap-
47. Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 500 (1854) (Curtis J., dissenting); McNutt v.
Bland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 9, 23, 27 (1844) (Daniel J., dissenting).
48. See K. STAmPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 (1965).
49. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO,
& H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 844-
47 (2d ed. 1973); F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 56-69
(1928).
50. On January 1, 1866, North Carolina's debt was $14,369,500; by October 1, 1870, it had
risen to $33,084,641. Ratchford, The North Carolina Public Debt, 1870-1878, 10 N.C. HIST. REV.
1, 3 (1933).
51. W. PowELL, NORTH CAROLINA: A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 154 (1977).
52. N.C: CONST. art. V, § 5 (1868).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
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italized value of the prewar labor system, and the fourteenth amendment5 4 in
1868 had destroyed the Confederate war debt. So the Reconstruction bonds
were peddled, usually at a great discount, in the money markets of the North-
east and Europe. The disputes that arose over repayment raised obvious ques-
tions under the contracts clause of the federal Constitution.55 If the federal
courts were ousted of jurisdiction, it could only be because of the eleventh
amendment.
Reconstruction in North Carolina ended in 1870 when the federal army
of occupation was withdrawn and the Democratic Party returned to power.
North Carolina's conservative leaders after the end of Reconstruction, like
those of the South generally, were referred to as Bourbons.56 The term means
social and political reactionaries and comes, of course, from the name of the
French royal family, whose scion forfeited the chance of restoration in 1871 by
insisting that the white flag of Bourbon replace the Revolutionary tricolor.
5 7
On coming to power in 1870, the Bourbons took action against the Recon-
struction bonds. The special tax acts were repealed, and the money already
collected was appropriated to the use of the state government.58 Because the
Reconstruction Constitution of 1868 had expressly prohibited the repudiation
of the state debt,5 9 the legislature began the process that ended in 1873 with
the popular approval of an amendment repealing the prohibition.
60 Unmis-
takably, North Carolina was intent on repudiating its debt. But the federal
courts, the keepers of the Marshallian tradition, might have something to say
about that.
Perhaps to avoid the bad odor of the special tax bonds, the litigators sued
first on some antebellum bonds that had been in default since 1869. These
bonds, which were known as "construction bonds," had been authorized in
1849 and 1855 to finance the building of the North Carolina Railroad.6' They
were secured by a first mortgage on railroad stock owned by the state. Be-
cause the railroad was turning a nice profit at the time and paying dividends to
the state, the litigators probably felt confident of recovering the arrearages.
Recovery would also pay dividends, as it were, for the holders of the special
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4: "fN]either the United States nor any State shall assume or
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States ... "
55. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1: "No State shall.. . pass any.. . law impairing the
obligation of contracts ..
56. W. POWELL, supra note 51, at 172.
57. 3 A. COBBAN, A HisTORY OF MODERN FRANCE 16 (1965). Needless to say, this is the
same family of which Talleyrand spoke when he said: "/s n'ont rien appri, ni Hen oub/. "
("They have learned nothing, and forgotten nothing.") J. BARTLE'r, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 400
(15th ed. 1980).
58. Law of March 8, 1870, ch. 71, 1869-70 N.C. Sess. Laws 119.
59. N.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 6; art. V, § 4 (1868).
60. Law of Feb. 24, 1873, ch. 85, 1872-73 N.C. Sess. Laws 115; Law of Jan. 19, 1872, ch. 53,
§ 1, 1871-72 N.C. Sess. Laws 81.
61. Law of Feb. 14, 1855, ch. 32, 1854-55 N.C. Sess. Laws 64; Law of Jan. 27, 1849, ch. 82,
1848-49 N.C. Sess. Laws 138.
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tax bonds. The inviolability of North Carolina's obligations would be estab-
lished, and so would federal jurisdiction over the controversy.
In 1871, in Swasey v. North Carolina Railroad,62 the holders of the con-
struction bonds sued the railroad, its directors, and the state treasurer asking
for an injunction against the payment of dividends to the state, the appoint-
ment of a receiver to collect the dividends for the bondholders, and the sale of
stock if the dividends were insufficient. At the commencement of the suit, it
appeared that no stock certificates had ever been issued to the state. The court
ordered the issuance of the proper certificates to a receiver, who was appointed
to collect the dividends and pay them over to the bondholders.
The dividends were sufficient to pay the current interest but not to dis-
charge the arrearages, and in 1874 the bondholders asked for the sale of stock.
The case was heard by federal District Judge Bond and Morrison R. Waite,
Chief Justice of the United States, sitting on circuit. North Carolina chal-
lenged the court's jurisdiction, but the Chief Justice, on behalf of the court,
rejected the state's arguments. The eleventh amendment was inapposite, said
the Chief Justice, because North Carolina, although interested in the matter,
was not a party of record. To the contention that the state was a necessary
party, without whom the case could not be heard, the Chief Justice replied:
If the state could be brought into court, it undoubtedly should be
made a party before a decree is rendered, but since the case of Os-
born v. Bank of U.S. . . . it has been the uniform practice of the
courts of the United States to take jurisdiction of causes affecting the
property of a state in the hands of its agents without making the state
a party, when the property or the agent is within the jurisdiction. In
such cases the courts act through the instrumentality of the property
or the agent.
63
The "real question" was, therefore, whether the court had jurisdiction over the
property or the agent. Finding that it had jurisdiction over the property, the
Chief Justice ordered an accounting of the amount due and the sale of the
security if the state failed to pay by April 1, 1875. The defendants appealed to
the Supreme Court, but it dismissed the appeal on the ground that the order
was not final because the account was not complete. 4 For an unexplained
reason, the plaintiffs did not force a sale, and until 1890 the receiver continued
to collect the state's dividends on behalf of the bondholders.
65
What Swasey revealed about the status of the eleventh amendment dur-
ing Reconstruction-that the Marshallian tradition was alive and well-was
twice confirmed by the Supreme Court. The two leading cases of the period,
both involving Southern states, arose respectively out of disputes concerning
railroads and state bonds, two fertile fields for litigation during the Gilded
62. 23 F. Cas. 518 (C.C.E.D.N.C. 1874) (No. 13,679).
63. Id. at 519 (citation omitted).
64. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 405 (1875) (Waite, C.J.).
65. Ratchford, The, Conversion of the North Carolina Public Debt After 1879, 10 N.C. HIsT.
REv. 251, 253 (1933).
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Age. In "one of the great railroad give-aways of the time,"' 66 the assets of the
Memphis, El Paso, and Pacific Railroad were turned over to the Texas and
Pacific Railroad in return for a nominal consideration. The losers were the
bondholders in the Memphis, El Paso, and Pacific, most of whom were French
investors. The winner was the notorious Tom Scott, later president of the
Pennsylvania Railroad and associate of John A.C. Gray, the court-appointed
receiver of the insolvent Memphis, El Paso, and Pacific line. Gray had been
named by Justice Joseph P. Bradley, a railroad attorney appointed to the
Court by President Grant.67 In an extraordinary proceeding in 1872, Bradley
had convened his Circuit Court for the Western District of Texas in Newark,
New Jersey, and approved Gray's handling of his receivership.
68
In a later phase of the litigation in 1873, Gray sought to defend the Mem-
phis, El Paso, and Pacific's title to its most valuable assets, land grants from
Texas, against seizure by the state.69 The Texas Constitution of 1869 had de-
clared all land grants forfeited unless the grantee had built all the lines prom-
ised. Asserting that Texas' belligerency during the Civil War had rendered its
fulfillment impossible, Gray on behalf of the railroad sued to enjoin the Texas
governor from seizing the land. The governor, like his Georgia counterpart a
generation earlier, asserted the bar of the eleventh amendment and cited
Madrazo. Ignoring the inconvenient precedent, the Court repulsed the attack
on its jurisdiction by harking back to Osborn v. Bank of the United States.
That case, it held, stood for three propositions dispositive of the governor's
claimed immunity:
(1) A Circuit Court of the United States, in a proper case in equity,
may enjoin a State officer from executing a State law in conflict
with the Constitution or a statute of the United States, when
such execution will violate the rights of the complainant.
(2) Where the State is concerned, the State should be made a party,
if it could be done. That it cannot be done is a sufficient reason
for the omission to do it, and the court may proceed to decree
against the officers of the State in all respects as if the State were
a party to the record.
(3) In deciding who are parties to the suit the court will not look
beyond the record. Making a State officer a party does not
make the State a party, although her law may have prompted
his action, and the State may stand behind him as the real party
in interest. A State can be made a party only by shaping the bill
expressly with that view, as where individuals or corporations
are intended to be put in that relation to the case.70
Finding itself with jurisdiction, the Court proceeded to the merits. It accepted
66. Friedman, Joseph P. Bradley, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT, 1789-1969, at 1181, 1190 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969).
67. See Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme Court and the Legal
Tender Cases (pts. 1-2), 54 HARv. L. REV. 977, 1128 (1941).
68. Forbes v. Memphis, El Paso & Pac. R.R., 9 F. Cas. 408 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1872) (No. 4,926).
69. Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1872).
70. Id. at 220.
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the railroad's excuse for nonperformance and enjoined the governor from in-
terference with the railroad's land. Not even John Marshall had given a state's
claim of sovereign immunity such short shrift.
7 1
As late as 1875, the Supreme Court still was adhering to the Osborn rule.
In Board ofLiquidation v. McComb72 the Court was confronted by an attempt
by another state of the old Confederacy, Louisiana, to play fast and loose with
her creditors.73 In 1874 the legislature had created the Board of Liquidation
to fund the state debt.74 The Board was to issue new bonds, called consoli-
dated bonds, bearing seven percent interest, and offer them in exchange for
outstanding bonds at the rate of sixty cents on the dollar. A contemporaneous
amendment to the Louisiana Constitution declared that the consolidated
bonds were valid contracts with the state and imposed a tax to service the
bonds, which was to be levied and collected annually without further legisla-
tion.75 Only one year later, the legislature enacted a statute76 that directed the
Board to exchange consolidated bonds for the outstanding debt of the Louisi-
ana Levee Company at par, not at the reduced rate of exchange offered other
creditors. Henry S. McComb, a bondholder who had accepted consolidated
bonds, sued the Board in federal court to keep his security from being diluted
and won an injunction against the exchange with the Levee Company. Af-
firming the decision for a unanimous Court, Justice Joseph P. Bradley ruled
that the eleventh amendment did not insulate a public officer from judicial
compulsion in the performance of his nondiscretionary duty.77 Furthermore,
the writ of mandamus was available to compel needful action, and an injunc-
tion was available to prevent illegal interference.78 Whether or not the officer
was acting pursuant to state law was immaterial, if the Court found the law
unconstitutional. 79 John Marshall's Federalist faith in the rights of property
and the power of the national courts was alive and well. Northern creditors of
Southern states were seemingly well protected.
Shortly after Justice Bradley announced the Court's decision in McComb,
however, a political crisis occurred that was to alter the law of the eleventh
amendment. The presidential election of November 1876 ended in a dead-
lock.80 The Democratic nominee, Samuel J. Tilden, received a majority of the
popular vote but was one vote short of a majority in the Electoral College.
There was a contest over one Oregon elector, and there were double and con-
71. Justice Davis, joined by Chief Justice Chase, dissented "because the State is exempt from
suit at the instance of private persons, and on the face of the bill it is apparent that the State is
arraigned as a defendant." Id. at 233 (Davis, J., dissenting).
72. 92 U.S. 531 (1875).
73. For more details on Louisiana history and politics, see Orth, The Fair Fame and Name of
Louisiana: The Eleventh Amendment and the End of Reconstruction, 2 TUL. LAW. 2 (1980).
74. 1874 La. Acts, No. 3.
75. LA. CONST. of 1868, amend., § 1 (1874).
76. 1875 La. Acts, No. 24.
77. 92 U.S. at 541.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See P. HAWORTH, THE HAYES-TILDEN DIsPUTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876
(1906).
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fficting returns of electoral votes from Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana.
To settle this dispute, Congress created an unprecedented Electoral Commis-
sion of fifteen members. On the Commission were five Senators and five Con-
gressmen, equally divided between the parties. The remaining Commissioners
were justices of the Supreme Court. Four justices-Nathan Clifford, Stephen
J. Field, William Strong, and Samuel F. Miller-were named outright. These
four, of whom the first two were Democrats and the second two Republicans,
were empowered to choose a fifth. Given the composition of the Commission,
the fifth justice would decide the outcome. When the impartial Justice David
Davis precipitately resigned from the Court, the choice fell on Justice Bradley,
a Republican. Voting with his fellow party members on straight party votes,
he declared the Republican nominee, Rutherford B. Hayes, President of the
United States.
The political maneuvers that preceded the inauguration of President
Hayes were as important in their results as they were obscure in their details.
Filled with drama, intrigue, and political low life, they deserve to be made the
subject of an historical novel-as indeed they have been.81 Their object was to
rearrange American politics for years to come. In this they succeeded, though
not in the manner intended by any of the participants. Hayes and his advisers
hoped to convert those Southerners who had been Whigs before the war into
loyal Republicans. The price of Southern acquiescence in the decision of the
Electoral Commission was an end to Reconstruction, a share in government
patronage, and federal subsidies for internal improvements, in particular the
Texas and Pacific Railroad. The horse trading was detailed and compli-
cated.82 Although the Reconstruction bonds were never referred to, the Com-
promise of 1877 altered the balance of power between the South and the
national government in such a way that the bonds were inevitably affected.
The federal troops were ordered back to their barracks, while the federal
courts remained open. The issue would soon arise whether the states of the
old Confederacy could shield themselves from their creditors with the eleventh
amendment.
III. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION
The compromise between Southern Democrats and Northern Republi-
cans meant that Congress would pass no more Civil Rights Acts83 or Force
Bills8 4 and that the President would no longer use the army to coerce the
South. The political decision to restore home rule to the states of the old Con-
federacy left two groups to the mercies of their enemies. Black Americans saw
their newly won rights slipping away; creditors of Southern states feared for
81. See G. VIDAL, 1876 (1976).
82. See C. WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE
END OF RECONSTRUCTION (rev. ed. 1956).
83. See Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875); Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16
Stat. 140 (1871); Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1868).
84. See Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871); Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat.
433 (1871).
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their investments. Both groups turned to the United States Supreme Court,
since the days of Marshall the proud defender of constitutional rights. In 1883
both groups were rebuffed by the Court. In the CivilRights Cases,85 the Court
ruled that Congress lacked the power under the fourteenth amendment8 6 to
outlaw racial segregation in accommodations. In two cases involving Louisi-
ana's state debt, Louisiana ex rel Elliott v. Jume187 and New Hampshire v. Lou-
isiana,88 the Court found itself impeded in enforcing the "obligation of
contracts" by the eleventh amendment.
As mentioned in connection with the McComb case, the Louisiana Con-
stitution had been amended in 1874 to impose a constitutional tax to service
the state's consolidated bonds. By 1879 the Bourbons were in the saddle in
Louisiana, and a constitutional convention was called to replace the state's
Reconstruction Constitution. So determined were the Bourbons to reduce
taxes that the convention added to the Constitution of 1879 an extraordinary
provision, known as the Debt Ordinance, which ended the constitutional tax
and reduced the rate of interest on the consolidated bonds from seven percent
to two percent for the five years after 1880, three percent for the fifteen years
after 1885, and four percent after 1900. If the bondholders preferred, they
were permitted to exchange the consolidated bonds for new bonds, bearing
four percent interest immediately, but available only at seventy-five cents on
the dollar. In addition, the Debt Ordinance provided that the interest due on
the consolidated bonds in January 1880 would not be paid.
Needles§ to say, the bondholders who had already surrendered forty per-
cent of their claims were loath to accept lower rates of interest or to surrender
a quarter of their principal. Several immediately brought suit in federal court,
claiming that the Debt, Ordinance violated the contracts clause of the federal
Constitution. In Louisiana ex rel Elliott v. Jumel,89 a bondholding relator
sought to compel Louisiana to order the state auditor, Allen Jumel, to pay the
interest on the consolidated bonds according to the terms agreed in 1874. The
lower court denied relief, and in 1883, by a vote of seven to two, the Supreme
Court affirmed its judgment. The Court's opinion, written by Chief Justice
Morrison R. Waite, did little more than note that Louisiana law prohibited
suit against the state in her own courts, and that the eleventh amendment fore-
closed the federal courts. McComb was distinguished on the ground that the
85. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV:
§ 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
§ 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.
87. 107 U.S. 711 (1882).
88. 108 U.S. 76 (1882).
89. 107 U.S. 711 (1882).
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Board of Liquidation had been the trustee of the consolidated bond issue.90
Among the majority, incidently, were Justice Bradley, the author of McComb,
and Justice Miller, who had joined in the decision of Mc Comb. These two
justices, who seemed to have changed their minds on the eleventh amendment,
were the only surviving Republicans who had served on the Electoral Com-
mission of 1877.
The only surviving Democratic justice from the Commission was Stephen
J. Field. In Jumel Field filed a vigorous dissent. Rhetorically asking if the
contracts clause was of any efficacy, he replied: "The majority of the court
answer 'No'. I answer, adhering to the doctrines taught by a long line of illus-
trious judges preceding me, 'Yes, it is;' and though now denied, I feel confident
that at no distant day its power will be reasserted and maintained." 91 The
theory Field would have relied on, had he been writing for a majority, was
simple:
When a State enters into the markets of the world as a borrower, she,
for the time, lays aside her sovereignty and becomes responsible as a
civil corporation, And [sic] although suits against her even then may
not be allowed, her officers can be compelled to do what she then
contracts that they shall do.
9 2
In defense of his position Field asserted one of the most powerful concepts of
late nineteenth-century jurisprudence: property. "If contracts are not ob-
served, no property will in the end be respected; and all history shows that
rights of persons are unsafe when property is insecure." 93 The other dissenter
in Jumel, Justice John Marshall Harlan, shared Field's conviction that the de-
cision was a break with precedent: "[Tihe opinion of the court is in conflict
with the spirit and tenor of our former decisions, subversive of long-estab-
lished doctrines, and dangerous to the national supremacy as defined and lim-
ited by the Constitution . . . . 94 Ironically, this threat to the national
supremacy emerged within twenty years of Appomattox.
The stakes were high, and the bondholders were evidently men with ex-
cellent legal advice and considerable political influence. Shortly after the Lou-
isiana constitutional convention-about the time, in other words, that the
Jume! litigation was commenced-the legislatures of New Hampshire and
New York passed extraordinary legislation.95 These two states offered their
names and legal advisers to citizens who stood to lose if Louisiana were per-
mitted to readjust her debt. The attorneys general of the two Northern states
were authorized to accept the assignments of Louisiana debts and to pay any
money collected, less expenses, to the assignors. The bondholders obviously
90. Id. at 726.
91. Id. at 733 (Field, J., dissenting).
92. Id at 740 (Field, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Field, ., dissenting and quoting himself in Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 767
(1878)).
94. Id. at 746-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
95. Law of July 18, 1879, ch. 42, 1879 N.H. Laws 357; Law of May 15, 1880, ch. 298, 1880
N.Y. Laws 440.
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anticipated that Justice Field's views on the eleventh amendment would not
prevail in the post-Reconstruction Supreme Court. So they attempted an end
run around the amendment. Whatever its effect on the Court's jurisdiction,
the eleventh amendment did not touch the grant of original jurisdiction over
"Controversies between two or more States."'96 The Court could not dodge its
responsibility under the contracts clause on jurisdictional grounds-or so the
litigators supposed. In fact, the Court did. In New Hampshire v. Louisiana,
97
decided the same day as Jumel, a unanimous Court held that the eleventh
amendment prevented it from hearing cases in which a state, acting on behalf
of her citizens, seeks relief against another state, when the prosecuting state
has no interest of her own.98 Of course, New Hampshire and New York as-
serted their rights as sovereigns to collect from another sovereign debts owed
their citizens. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Waite denied that Ameri-
can states possessed that undoubted badge of sovereignty; it was surrendered
on joining the Union. In proof of this, the Chief Justice relied on Chisholm v.
Georgia.99 In that case, it was held that a citizen of one state could sue an-
other state in federal court.1° From this holding, the Chief Justice inferred
that a state could not sue on behalf of her citizen, there being no reason to
allow two remedies. Ergo, when the eleventh amendment superseded
Chisholm, the citizen was remediless.
The commentators were loud in their wail. The New Hampshire and
New York strategy apparently had been long in preparation, and the law re-
views had staked out Northern and Southern positions on the issue.10 1 But
fumel was a bomtshell. The greatest legal scholar of the day, John Norton
Pomeroy, was almost speechless: "In combating the reasoning and conclu-
sions of the court, we feel ourselves to be in the position of one called upon to
substantiate an axiom, or to sustain a truism."'1 2 But, as the bondholders
learned to their cost, the United States Constitution is not a set of axioms or
truisms; it is what the Supreme Court says it is. Reminiscent of the response to
Chisholm, a resolve was promptly introduced in Congress to repeal the elev-
enth amendment.' 0 3 But the North was sick of trying to reconstruct the South,
and the bondholders lacked popular sympathy. Still, it might be more accu-
rate to see the "shock of surprise" in 1883 that Justice Bradley discerned a
century earlier.
The decisions in fume! and New Hampshire indicated that the Louisiana
adjustment of 1879 was going to last. North Carolina also adjusted her debt in
96. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
97. 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
98. Id. at 90-91.
99. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
100. Id. at 466.
101. See Johnson, Can States Be Compelled to Pay Their Debts? 12 AM. L. REv. 625 (1878)
(answering yes); Burroughs, Can States Be Compelled to Pay Their Debts? 3 VA. L.J. 129 (1879)
(answering no).
102. Pomeroy, The Supreme Court and State Repudiation--the Virginia and Louisiana Cases,
17 AM. L. REv. 684, 702 (1883).
103. 3 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 388 (1922).
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1879.104 Prewar bonds were scaled down to forty percent of face value; bonds
issued for internal improvements during and after the war were scaled down
to twenty-five percent of face value; the funding bonds of 1866 and 1868 were
scaled down to fifteen percent of face value. As accrued interest was not pro-
vided for and as the interest on the new bonds was lower than that on the old,
the settlement overall equalled less than thirteen percent of the claims.105 The
special tax bonds were not included in this settlement. They were repudiated
outright. By a constitutional amendment initiated in 1879, the legislature was
deprived of the power to pay anything on the special tax bonds; any proposal
to pay them had to be approved by a majority of all the qualified voters of the
state.106 By this amendment bonds with a face value of more than twelve
million dollars and accrued interest of seven million dollars were repudi-
ated.1
0 7
The only remaining question was whether the United States Supreme
Court would be open to plaintiffs complaining about the state's impairment of
the obligation of her contract with the bondholders. The litigation began with
what seemed like the strongest case. Among the bonds converted at forty per-
cent of face value were some authorized in 1855 to aid the Atlantic and North
Carolina Railroad. 108 Like the construction bonds involved in Swasey, these
bonds were secured by a lien on stock owned by the state. In Christian .
Atlantic & North Carolina Railroad,'0 9 the bondholders sued the railroad, its
president and directors, the person holding the state's proxy, and the state
treasurer. The bondholders asked the federal court to enjoin the railroad from
paying dividends to the state, to appoint a receiver to collect the dividends for
the bondholders, and to order the sale of stock if the dividends were insuffi-
cient. Christian was, in other words, the identical twin of Swasey. The only
difference, if difference it be, was that in Christian the state already held the
stock certificates, while in Swasey no certificates had ever been issued. Of
course, in Swasey the court had ordered the issuance of certificates to the re-
ceiver. Justice Joseph P. Bradley, writing for a unanimous Court, found the
difference dispositive. Although the state admittedly had mortgaged her stock,
she had retained possession. The mortgagees were out of possession, and the
mortgagor in possession was a sovereign state and immune from suit. Chief
Justice Waite's decision in Swasey, read in the light of his later opinion in
Jumel, was distinguished in the following manner:
We are referred to a decision made at the circuit by Chief Justice
Waite in the case of Swasey v. North Carolina Railroad Company...
in which, in a case similar to the present, it was held that, inasmuch
as the shares of stock belonging to the State were pledged for the
104. Law of March 4, 1879, ch. 98, 1879 N.C. Sess. Laws 183.
105. Ratchford, The 4djustment of the North Carolina Public Debt, 1879-1883, 10 N.C. HIST.
Rnv. 157, 158 (1933).
106. Law of March 14, 1879, ch. 268, 1879 N.C. Sess. Laws 436.
107. Ratchford, supra note 105, at 166.
108. Law of Feb. 12, 1855, ch. 232, 1854-55 N.C. Sess. Laws 298.
109. 133 U.S. 233 (1890).
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payment of the complainants' bonds, they were held by the railroad
company as trustee for the bondholders as well as the State; and that
if the trustee was a party to the suit, it was not necessary that the
State should be a party. We are not certain that we are fully in pos-
session of the facts of that case; but if they were the same as in the
present case, with the highest respect for the opinions of the lamented
Chief Justice, we cannot assent to the conclusions to which he ar-
rived. In the general principles, that a State cannot be sued; that its
property, in the possession of its own officers and agents, cannot be
reached by its creditors by means of judicial process; and that in any
such proceeding the State is an indispensable party; Chief Justice
Waite certainly did express his emphatic concurrence, in the able
opinion delivered by him on behalf of the court, in the case of Louisi-
ana v. Jumel. . . . His views in the Swasey case seem to have been
based on the notion that the stock of the state was lodged in the
hands of the railroad company as a trustee for the parties concerned,
and was not in the hands of the State itself, or of its immediate of-
ficers and agents. But if the facts in that case were as he supposed
them to be, the facts in the present case are certainly different from
that. No stockholder of any company ever had more perfect posses-
sion and ownership of his stock than the State of North Carolina has
of the stock in question. There may be contract claims against it; but
they are claims against the State, because based solely on the contract
of the State, and not on possession. 110
North Carolina's failure to secure for itself the certificates in Swasey had cost
it two and a half million dollars, because without the Swasey decision the
holders of the construction bonds would undoubtedly have been treated as
were the other bondholders.' 11
The Court's unwillingness to interfere in the post-Reconstruction
financial readjustment was obvious. But too much money was at stake to
leave any loophole unexplored. By its terms, the eleventh amendment did not
apply to suits brought against one of the United States by citizens of that state.
It was a simple matter for a North Carolina citizen to sue his state in federal
court for payment of the long-overdue interest on the special tax bonds. The
argument was obvious: the act authorizing the bonds and imposing a special
tax to service them was a contract, which subsequent statutes and constitu-
tional amendments attempted to impair. In North Carolina v. Temple,' 1 2 this
argument was made by a North Carolinian in the United States Circuit Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The two judges who heard the suit
disagreed on the suability of the state. Judge Bond, perhaps recalling his sit-
ting with Chief Justice Waite more than a dozen years earlier on the Swasey
case, believed that it was maintainable, but his colleague Judge Seymour dis-
agreed. Justice Bradley quickly disposed of the matter. Sovereign immunity,
110. Id. at 245-46 (citations omitted).
I 11. Ratchford, supra note 65, at 257.
112. 134 U.S. 22 (1890).
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constitutionally recognized by the eleventh amendment, protected the state.113
In Hans v. Louisiana,"14 a similar suit decided the same day as Temple,
Justice Bradley reexamined the history of the eleventh amendment. Looking
backward a hundred years, he saw sovereign immunity writ large in the Con-
stitution. The decision in Chisholm created such a "shock of surprise" that it
was constitutionally reversed. Of course, this history lesson contradicted the
reasoning in the New Hampshire case. In the opinion written by Chief Justice
Waite and joined by Justice Bradley only a half dozen years earlier, the Court
had accepted Chisholm as a correct interpretation of the Constitution as it then
stood. Indeed, it had reasoned that the states, on adopting the Constitution,
had surrendered their rights as sovereigns to collect the debts of their citizens
because the Constitution provided a forum in which their citizens could sue
debtor states.1 15 Despite the inconsistent rationales, New Hampshire and
Hans were effective to cut off the bondholders' remedies.
Only one of the state's creditors was able to collect in full. The United
States of America, as trustee of funds held for Indian tribes, owned almost two
hundred thousand dollars worth of construction bonds. Although almost all
the other holders of this issue had compromised with the state in 1882 and
accepted new bonds, par for par, with remission of some interest,1 16 the fed-
eral government had stood out, insisting on the contract debt. In 1889 North
Carolina tendered the full principal and interest due on the bonds, which had
matured in 1884 and 1885. Not content with its pound of flesh, the United
States demanded the payment of interest after maturity. The state refused,
and the United States invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which of
course had not been diminished in this regard by the eleventh amendment. In
1890, in United States v. North Carolina,17 the Court ruled for the state, over
the dissent of Justices Miller, Field, and Harlan.
By 1890 the war was over, although the bondholders continued to mount
guerrilla attacks for more than forty years. In 1896, in Baltzer v. Nor/h Caro-
lina,118 holders of special tax bonds sued the state, claiming that the constitu-
tional amendment that prohibited payment was an impairment of their
contract with the state. The Supreme Court rejected the argument on the
ground that under North Carolina law before the amendment the state
supreme court had no power to issue a binding judgment against the state. As
there had never been a remedy under state law, the constitutional amendment
worked no impairment. No consideration was given to the loss of a federal
remedy.
In 1904 the bondholders who had never accepted the readjustment of
1879 found a plaintiff not barred by the eleventh amendment. In South Da-
113. Id. at 30.
114. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
115. See text accompanying notes 397-100 supra.
116. Ratchford, supra note 105, at 163-65.
117. 136 U.S. 211, 221 (1890).
118. 161 U.S. 240 (1896). See also Baltzer & Taaks v. North Carolina, 161 U.S. 246 (1896).
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kota v. North Carolina,1 19 a state won a judgment on bonds donated to it. A
closely divided Court distinguished the New Hampshire case on the ground
that South Dakota, the recipient of a completed gift, was the real party in
interest.' 20 The donor's motive was, of course, to induce North Carolina to
settle with him on more favorable terms--or face donations to other states
able to collect at par. In 1905 the state reluctantly negotiated a compromise
with her creditor.
121
In despair, the litigators for the bondholders tried their final gamble.
While the eleventh amendment barred federal jurisdiction over suits "against
one of the United States ... by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State," it
did not preclude suits by foreign sovereigns. Plans were made to give North
Carolina obligations to Venezuela and Columbia, and bonds were actually
given to Cuba. But diplomatic pressure was exerted to forestall a suit.1 22 The
idea, however, was to reappear later. In 1934 the Principality of Monaco
forced the Supreme Court to decide the issue of whether a "Foreign State"
could compel a delinquent American state to pay its bonds.' 2 3 Involved were
thousands of dollars worth of antebellum Mississippi bonds, but an affirmative
ruling obviously would have affected the value of millions of dollars worth of
repudiated Reconstruction obligations. Like South Dakota thirty years ear-
lier, Monaco was the recipient of a completed gift. Like South Dakota's do-
nor, Monaco's donor was presumably moved not by altruism but by a desire to
induce a settlement. That desire was frustrated, however, by the decision that
federal courts lack jurisdiction over such suits, absent consent to jurisdiction
by the state. As in Hans, the eleventh amendment was relied on as constitu-
tional recognition of sovereign immunity. 124
IV. CONCLUSION
A turning point in the history of the eleventh amendment was 1877. Pro-
posed and ratified in the first flush of fear that out-of-state claimants could
invoke the aid of federal jurisdiction, the amendment soon had been confined
by the Federalist faith of John Marshall. The Marshallian tradition had suited
the nationalist needs of Reconstruction, and so the confinement of the amend-
ment had continued through 1876. After the Compromise of 1877 the national
will to enforce unpopular policies in the South was lacking. The states of the
old Confederacy were readmitted to the political life of the Union under gov-
ernments of their own choosing, and the Nation's interests in the rights of its
black citizens were foresworn for almost a century. Incidental victims of the
historic Compromise were the holders of Reconstruction bonds. In the de-
119. 192 U.S. 286 (1904).
120. Id. at 310.
121. For a detailed account of the strategy leading to this compromise, see R. DURDEN, RE-
CONSTRUCTION BONDS AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY PoLmcs: SouTH DAKOTA v. NORTH CARO-
LINA (1962).
122. Ratchford, supra note 65, at 269-71.
123. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
124. Id. at 330.
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cades after 1877 the creditors of the Southern states made repeated and imagi-
native attempts to enforce the obligation of their contracts, but all in vain.
Like the out-of-state claimants in the early Republic, the bondholders were
met with the eleventh amendment. After 1877, and until the issue faded from
public consciousness, the eleventh amendment, by its terms or by implication,
was used by the Supreme Court to deny itself jurisdiction over an issue it
could not resolve.
Surveys of the amendment's history would be more comprehensible if at-
tention were paid to the political facts of life. After the politicians had agreed
to end Reconstruction, there was no way for the judges to enforce an order to
collect a tax or pay a debt. North Carolina, for example, was able to renege on
its obligations to the extent of twenty million dollars. Chief Justice Waite and
Justice Bradley, despite inconsistent precedents of their own making in Swasey
and McComb, led the Court to turn its back on the creditors. In Jumel, New
Hampshire, Christian, Hans, Temple, and Balzer, the interests of the bond-
holders were sacrificed to the cause of national reconciliation. At Appomattox
Courthouse in 1865 the slave owners had lost their human property, and the
investors in Confederate securities their equity. The thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments subsequently made the losses legal. At the inauguration of Ruth-
erford B. Hayes in 1877 the bondholders lost their money. It was the capital-
ists' Appomattox. The eleventh amendment, as subsequently interpreted,
made it legal.
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